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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARKELL HARRISON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
BLAKE NIELSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20070442-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he 
challenged his convictions for robbery, a second degree felony, and attempted burglary, a 
class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court properly grant the State's motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing all claims raised in the petition for post-conviction relief? 
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's 'legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for' correctness . . . and views 'the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, <f 6, — P.3d —(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is relevant to this appeal and reproduced in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged petitioner by amended information with one count each of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and burglary, a third degree felony. See Amended 
Information, R. 301-02. A jury convicted petitioner of robbery, a second degree felony and 
attempted burglary, a class A misdemeanor. See Verdict and Special Verdict Forms, R. 303, 
305. The Jury also found that the gang enhancement applied to petitioner's robbery 
conviction. R. 304. 
Petitioner timely appealed and this Court affirmed his convictions. State v. Harrison, 
2005 UT App. 525 U (Memorandum Decision), Addendum B. 
Petitioner filed a timely petition ("petition") for post-conviction relief pursuant to the 
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 -304 (West 
2004). R. 1-24. The State filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and a supporting memorandum. R. 327-48. On May 14,2007, the 
post-conviction court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 
petition. R. 349-54. Petitioner timely appealed. R. 355-56. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Late-night laundry run 
Although it was past midnight, Scott Devoe decided it was time to do laundry. 
Because he often worked graveyard shifts, Devoe frequently did laundry in the middle of the 
night R. 390:10-11. So, about 12:30 a.m. on June 3, 2003, he loaded his dirty clothes into 
the back of a friend's SUV and drove to the Wash Around the Clock Laundromat in Ogden. 
R. 390:10-12. 
Unfortunately, this was the same night when petitioner, nicknamed "Chicago," R. 
390:245, and his friends decided to visit the laundromat with a very different agenda— 
breaking into the cash machine to secure enough money for a trip to Las Vegas, where they 
would sell cocaine. R. 390:221-22. 
When Devoe arrived at the laundromat, he pulled into the parking area behind the 
building, where large automatic doors led inside. R. 390:12-13. While pulling into the lot, 
Devoe noticed defendants by the laundromat power boxes. R. 390:13-15. He would later 
describe them as looking startled—"like a little kid does when they get caught doing 
something." R. 390:13. The two men then walked away and disappeared. R. 390:16. Devoe 
made sure they were gone before he started doing his laundry because they were "suspicious 
looking... acting like they were up to something..." R. 390:16. Devoe grabbed his laundry 
and went inside. R. 390:16-17. There were about four to six people in the business at that 
time, but by about 1:30 a.m., Devoe found himself alone. R. 390:17. 
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Lights out 
About 2 a.m., Devoe saw a man—later identified as co-defendant Bulice Adolphus 
Rushing—enter the laundromat and sit down in the booth by the door. R. 390:17-18. Devoe 
noticed nothing unusual about Rushing, except that he had no laundry or laundry equipment 
or supplies with him. R. 390:18-19. Devoe greeted him and turned around to continue doing 
his laundry. R. 390:19,20. When Devoe looked up again a couple of minutes later, Rushing 
had disappeared. R. 390:20. 
Then, petitioner appeared at the pay phone. Id. However, Devoe thought petitioner 
was only pretending to be having a phone conversation because he did not see petitioner put 
any money in the telephone, or hear any money drop into it, or see him punch any numbers. 
Id. Devoe noticed that petitioner too did not have laundry equipment or supplies with him. 
R. 390:23. 
"It's like he was making up the conversation," Devoe later testified. R. 390:20,21; see 
alsoR. 391:65-66. "[H]e was just hanging out." R. 390:23. 
Devoe asked petitioner if he had seen him before and the two talked briefly. R. 
390:22. Suddenly, the power went out in part of the building. R. 390:25. 
"[Everything is okay," petitioner assured Devoe. Id. 
About thirty seconds later, the power went out in the rest of the laundromat. Id. 
Petitioner again told Devoe not to worry and suggested that they wait in Devoe's SUV. Id. 
Devoe suspected that "something's not right," but he complied because he didn't feel like he 
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had a choice and because he had been hurt before trying to escape a threatening situation. R. 
390:25-26. Devoe left his laundry in the building and went out with petitioner to the SUV. 
R. 390:27. 
"We were gonna sell it to a white boy" 
Petitioner and Devoe waited in the SUV for about twenty minutes. R. 390:27, 37. 
Before long, Devoe saw Rushing approach the vehicle. R. 390:27-28. Rushing told 
petitioner that he needed to get a different tool, because the one he had wasn't working. R. 
390:28. Petitioner and Rushing nodded to each other and Rushing walked away. R. 390:28. 
Rushing returned to the nearby home at 955 Jefferson Avenue where he and petitioner 
had been partying earlier in the evening. Rushing was met by a friend, Bobbie Martinez, who 
was sitting on the porch. R. 390:224-25. Rushing asked if Martinez still had the "dummy 
dope," which was made of drywall and was intended to look like rock cocaine. R. 390:227-
28. Martinez and Rushing had earlier packaged the "dummy" dope in hopes of selling it to 
earn enough money to purchase the real thing. R. 390:227. The package was a baggie, 
twisted and burned to resemble a "twist." R. 390:228. Martinez retrieved the dummy dope 
and gave it to Rushing. R. 390:228. 
"We were gonna sell it to a white boy" down the street, Rushing told Martinez. R. 
390:228-29. Martinez followed Rushing to the laundromat. R. 390:229 
When Rushing returned to the parked SUV, he was holding a long object up his sleeve. 
R. 390:30. Rushing and petitioner just nodded at each other. Id. 
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"[Tjhey got thousands of dollars in that business/' petitioner told Devoe and promised 
to share it with him. R. 390:29, 146. Devoe said he did not want any. R. 390:29. Petitioner 
then asked if Devoe had money. When Devoe said he had about "20 bucks," petitioner asked 
if he could have it. Devoe refused. Id. Petitioner then produced a marijuana cigarette, which 
the two men smoked. R. 390:32, 33. Devoe testified that he thought it would be a good idea 
to smoke marijuana with petitioner because petitioner was agitated that Devoe wouldn't give 
him money. R. 390:33. 
Devoe Sees the Damaged Coin Machine 
Devoe told petitioner two or three times that he wanted to go back into the laundromat 
to get his laundry, but petitioner told Devoe he could not go back in. R. 390:38. Finally, 
when Devoe insisted on going back into the laundromat, petitioner acquiesced. R. 390:38-39. 
When Devoe walked into the business he saw Rushing and Martinez standing in front 
of the coin machine. R. 390:39,41. Devoe immediately recognized Martinez as a customer 
who used to come into the convenience store where he worked. R. 390:40. He initially felt 
relieved to see her, another customer in the laundromat, but then petitioner introduced her to 
Devoe as his girlfriend. Id. At the same time, Devoe noticed that the coin machine and the 
surrounding wall had been "beaten in." R. 390:41. There was plaster on the floor and a 
portion of the coin machine had been tipped. R. 390:42,149. Devoe later testified that none 
of that damage had been there earlier. R. 390:42. 
Devoe began to collect his laundry. R. 390:40,42. Petitioner helped, but was upset— 
yelling and grabbing Devoe's clothes and throwing them into the baskets. R. 390:43-44, 75. 
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Petitioner then demanded that Devoe give him and the others a ride. R. 390:44. Devoe 
agreed because petitioner was "pissed." R. 390:44. Devoe finished collecting his laundry and 
the four of them left. R. 390:45. On the way out to the car, petitioner demanded the car keys, 
but Devoe refused and got into the driver's seat. R. 390:45-46. Petitioner got in the front 
passenger seat, Bobbie Martinez sat in back behind Devoe, and Rushing sat behind petitioner. 
R. 390:45-47. 
Petitioner and Rushing Beat Devoe and Take His Wallet 
Petitioner instructed Devoe where to drive. R. 390:47. As they drove, petitioner and 
Martinez offered to sell Devoe drugs. R. 390:49. Devoe refused, angering Martinez. R. 
390:49. Devoe drove until petitioner told him to stop. R. 390:48. Petitioner then made a 
second attempt to grab the car keys, but Devoe pulled them out of the ignition before 
petitioner could reach them. R. 390:49-51. 
At that point, Martinez jumped out of SUV and pressed her body against the driver's 
side door, preventing Devoe from getting out. R. 390:51. Petitioner and Rushing demanded 
Devoe's wallet. R. 390:52. When he refused, both petitioner and Rushing began to punch 
him. R. 390:51-52, 54. Rushing told petitioner to "stick" Devoe, although Devoe never saw 
a knife. R. 390:52, 54. Petitioner put Devoe in a headlock, telling him "I'm just going to 
snap your neck." R. 390:52. During the struggle, Rushing got out of the SUV and opened 
Devoe's door. R. 390:53, 55. He or Martinez grabbed Devoe's wallet out from under his leg. 
R. 390:53. Rushing also tore a chain from around Devoe's neck. R. 390:54. Devoe later 
found the chain next to the SUV. R. 390:100-01, 119-20. 
7 
Rushing and Martinez told petitioner, "Let's go/' and started running. R. 390:55. 
Petitioner still had Devoe in a headloek inside the SUV and told Devoe he would "snap [his] 
ne[ck] anyways." R. 390:55.! When Devoe freed himself from the headloek, petitioner 
jumped out and started running with Martinez and Rushing. R. 390:55. The three ran until 
they turned the corner on Jefferson Avenue. R. 390:55-56. Petitioner, Rushing, and Martinez 
fled to 955 Jefferson Avenue, the home where they had partied earlier, and rifled through 
Devoe's wallet, which contained $20 to $30, Devoe's driver's license and his credit and 
Social Security cards. R. 390:95; 243-44, 283-84. 
Devoe Yells for Help 
Devoe started screaming "fire" and "rape" to alert neighbors to come out and help. R. 
390:56. Devoe then drove down the street to try to locate the three defendants. When he 
could not find them he returned to the point where he had first stopped. R. 390:56-57. A 
resident, Shelley Sandall, woke to Devoe's cry for help and came outside. R. 389:47, 52, 57, 
58. Devoe asked her to call 911, which she did. R. 389:47, 51, 63. Devoe spoke to the 
dispatcher and said that he was trying to do his wash when two black men came in and the 
power went out. R. 389:54. He also reported that one of them was in the laundry trying to 
break open the coin machine and that they later beat and mugged him. R. 390:58-59. 
]Devoe admitted at trial that he bore no sign of physical injury. R. 390:102. 
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The Investigation 
South Ogden Police Officer Trent Olsen arrived at 3:19 a.m. and interviewed Devoe. 
R. 389:72-75; R. 390:59. Devoe was frightened and upset. R. 389:75, 103. 
When Officer Olsen arrived at the laundromat all the lights were off. R. 389:77. On 
the rear outside wall of the building, Officer Olsen saw that the two power boxes were 
damaged—the handles that turned the power on and off and the metal plates that secured the 
handles with locks had been ripped and mangled. R. 389:78-81. The damage appeared to 
have been done with a prying device. R. 3 89:83. There was fresh paint dust and chips where 
the damage had been done. Id. 
There was also "substantial damage" inside the laundromat. R. 389:86. The sheetrock 
was demolished around the outside edge of the coin machine, its metal framing was peeled 
out, and it was partially pulled out of the wall, although it had not been breached. R. 389:86, 
93, The damage to the coin machine appeared similar to the damage to the power boxes. R. 
389:88. There were also numerous pry marks on the door and the guard covering the dead 
bolt lock was bent. The door and door frame were also bent. R. 389:87-88, 91, 103-04; R. 
390:149. 
Brett Heninger, owner of the laundromat, testified that he had walked through the 
laundromat the day before the incident. R. 390:146. At that time, he observed no damage to 
the power boxes, the coin machine, the office door or anywhere else on the premises. R. 
390:146-52. 
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The investigation was turned over to Ogden City Detective Steve Reaves. R. 391:30-
32. Detective Reaves interviewed Devoe and reviewed the laundromat's surveillance CD 
recording ("video"). R. 391:33-34, 47. Despite the poor quality of the video, Detective 
Reaves could discern Devoe in the laundromat and the SUV behind the building. R. 391:36, 
45. The video also showed petitioner and Rushing entering just after 2 a.m. R. 391:42, 46. 
Arrests 
Soon, Detective Reaves received a tip that suspects matching the description from the 
video were living at 955 Jefferson Avenue. R. 391:48. Two days after the incident, Detective 
Reaves visited petitioner at that location. R. 391:48, 49. Detective Reaves immediately 
thought petitioner might be person he saw in the video. R. 391:49. 
Petitioner agreed to answer Detective Reaves' questions. R. 391:54. He 
acknowledged that he had spent the night at the 955 Jefferson location, although he did not 
live there. R. 391:54-55. He also allowed Detective Reaves to look through his duffle bag. 
R. 391:56. Detective Reaves was looking for a particular shirt matching one worn by a 
suspect in the surveillance video. R. 391:56. He did not find the shirt in petitioner's bag. 
Later, however, a friend of defendant's who lived at that address gave the detective a shirt that 
appeared to be the one petitioner was wearing in the video. R. 391:51-54, 56. Petitioner 
testified at trial that he was wearing the shirt that night and that he had borrowed it from 
Rushing. R. 391:269. 
Detective Reaves then had petitioner look at a still frame from the laundromat 
surveillance video, and petitioner said, "That is me." R. 391:58, 60, 248. At that point, 
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Detective Reaves took petitioner into custody for questioning. The detective read petitioner 
his Miranda rights, but petitioner consented to continue the interview. R. 391:58-59. 
Petitioner denied involvement in the burglary or robbery at the laundromat. Rather, he 
claimed that he was at the laundromat only to make a phone call and that later the power went 
out. R. 391:59, 61. He also stated that he was a homosexual and that he had a homosexual 
encounter with Devoe—they "did each other." R. 391:62-63. 
Devoe, however, said that was not true. He testified that, while waiting in the SUV, he 
and petitioner discussed their experiences with drugs and sexual orientation. R. 390:37. 
Devoe asked petitioner if he might have seen petitioner "down by the river," a "cruising area" 
for homosexual men near the Ogden River. R. 390:37, 66-67. In that context, Devoe 
mentioned that he was bisexual. R. 390:22-23, 37. However, neither he nor petitioner 
discussed or engaged in any sexual activity. Id. 
Petitioner did acknowledge that he and Devoe smoked marijuana out in the SUV. R. 
391:64. After viewing the video images depicting another black male, he said that he was 
unaware that there was another man present. R. 391:65. 
Detective Reaves assembled three photo lineups, each including one of Devoe's 
assailants—petitioner, Rushing, and Martinez. R. 391:67-68. Devoe readily identified 
petitioner and Martinez, R. 391:72-73,75,155, but had difficulty recognizing Rushing in the 
photo lineup. R. 391:72-73. However, when a picture of Rushing appeared as Detective 
Reaves leafed through a folder containing photographs of other suspects, Devoe immediately 
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identified Rushing. "That'shim," he said without any prompting. R. 391:72, 75-76,161-62, 
164. 
A confidential informant told Reaves that Rushing was hiding out in Salt Lake City. R. 
391:10-16,23. Following the issuance of an arrest warrant, Detective Reaves found Rushing 
in custody at the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 391:93, 95. Officers eventually located Martinez 
through the Northern Utah Criminal Apprehension Team. R. 391:94. 
Martinez told Detective Reaves that she and Rushing decided to go over to the 
laundromat. She said her plan was to sell "dummy dope" to Devoe. R. 390:228-29. 
Martinez pleaded guilty to the aggravated robbery and burglary charges and agreed to testify 
truthfully for the prosecution in exchange for a sentencing reduction. R. 390:212-13. 
Martinez's Testimony 
Martinez testified that Rushing had discussed robbing the laundromat and taking the 
coin machine. R. 390:220-21. On the night in question, Martinez went with Rushing to the 
laundromat. Petitioner was at the laundromat with the victim, Scott Devoe. R. 390:231-32. 
Martinez observed that the laundromat's lights were out and the coin machine was 
pulled out of the wall. R. 390:229-30. She assumed that Rushing and petitioner were robbing 
the laundromat because her observations matched the plan they had discussed earlier. R. 
390:231. 
Martinez testified that she, petitioner, Rushing and the victim all got in the victim's 
SUV. R. 390:233. She said that when the SUV stopped, petitioner yelled at Devoe, grabbed 
the steering wheel, and put the victim in a headlock. R. 390:238-40. Petitioner and Rushing 
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struggled with the victim in the SUV and eventually left with the victim's wallet. R. 390:241-
44. 
Petitioner's Testimony 
Petitioner testified at trial and denied any involvement in the charged offenses. He 
claimed he went to laundromat to make a telephone call, did not break into the coin machine 
and did not take Devoe's wallet. He also said Devoe agreed to give Martinez and Rushing a 
ride home. R. 391:216,233-34,229,244. He claimed the incident was simply a homosexual 
encounter in which he and Devoe indulged in drugs, including his sale to Devoe of counterfeit 
methamphetamine. R. 391:222-43. In support of that story, he said that Devoe was "hitting 
on [him]," and that he, as a bisexual, was responsive. R. 391:213-14, 222, 225-26. Once in 
the SUV, Devoe's aggressive sexual manipulations excited him, but he was unwilling to go 
further in public. R. 391:225-26, 240. 
During this encounter, he said, Devoe produced the marijuana which petitioner rolled 
into cigarettes and they smoked. R. 391:224-25, 239-40. He said Devoe also used his own 
supply to make two lines of methamphetamine, which they both ingested. R. 391:225. 
Petitioner also acknowledged that he had his own supply of methamphetamine and that he 
sold Devoe some "fake" methamphetamine for $20. R. 391:215, 238, 241-42. 
Petitioner's Appeal 
On appeal, petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for "fail[ing] to make 
any pretrial motions or objections during trial to prevent the introduction of evidence of [his] 
prior drug use and to object to the introduction of evidence of his codefendant's alleged drug 
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sales." State v. Harrison, 2005 UT App. 525 U, at ^ f 2 (Memorandum Decision). The Court 
of Appeals rejected petitioner's claim and affirmed his convictions. Id. at \ 9. 
The Postconviction Petition 
Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition raising six claims. First, petitioner 
claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that Detective Reaves illegally 
arrested him because did not read him his Miranda warning, even though the detective 
claimed at trial that a proper Miranda warning had been given. Second, he claimed his 
appellate counsel, Randy Richards, had a conflict because he worked at the same firm as John 
Caine, who initially represented petitioner at trial. Third, he claimed appellate counsel was 
ineffective for not alleging racial discrimination in the jury selection. Fourth, he claimed trial 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a certain, unspecified juror. Fifth, he claimed 
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising prosecutorial misconduct concerning 
testimony elicited from Detective Reaves about an interview with Rushing that implicated 
petitioner and for not arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court's 
curative instruction. Sixth, he claimed appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that 
the trial court's curative instruction was inadequate. 
The State moved for summary judgment on all of his claims. Petitioner opposed the 
motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On May 14, 2007, the post-
conviction court granted the State's summary judgment motion and dismissed the petition. 
See Ruling Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 349-54; see also 
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Findings of Undisputed Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, R. 363-83 ("Findings"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The post-conviction court properly granted summary judgment on 
petitioner's claim that Detective Reaves did not properly give him a Miranda warning and 
that lack of a warning invalidated his arrest. An arrest is not invalidated by the arresting 
officer's failure to give the defendant a Miranda warning. Additionally, there is no 
credible evidence that Detective Reaves committed perjury. Finally, appellate counsel 
omitted no "dead-bang" winning argument by not challenging Detective Reaves' 
statements regarding his interview with petitioner on appeal because the statements were 
consistent with trial counsel's strategy that the victim manufactured the allegations against 
petitioner because petitioner rebuffed the victim's sexual advances. 
Point II: The post-conviction court properly granted summary judgment on 
petitioner's claim that Detective Reaves fabricated a statement from co-defendant Bulice 
Rushing, who told Reaves that he knew someone named "Chicago," i.e., petitioner. Even 
assuming Reaves's testimony concerning the statement was not true—an assumption not 
supported by any credible evidence—petitioner suffered no prejudice because it was 
consistent with petitioner's own testimony that he and Rushing knew each other. Thus, 
appellate counsel did not overlook a "dead-bang" winning claim based on Reaves' alleged 
misstatement. 
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Point III: Petitioner's belated attempt to claim that genuine issues of material fact 
precluded granting the State's summary judgment motion is without merit. Even 
assuming Detective Reaves manufactured evidence against petitioner and perjured himself 
at trial—an unwarranted assumption—there were still no material facts that would have 
precluded summary judgment because the alleged facts concerning the allegedly 
fabricated evidence would not have supported a "dead-bang" winning argument on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The post-conviction court properly granted summary judgment on each of petitioner's 
claims based on the undisputed material facts and applicable law. Under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act (PCRA), petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing post-conviction 
claims that "could have been but w[ere] not raised at trial or on appeal." See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004). Petitioner has already appealed his conviction and this 
Court affirmed. Harrison, 2005 UT App. 525 U, at ^ f 2. Accordingly, petitioner cannot raise 
post-conviction claims of trial court error or ineffective assistance against his trial counsel 
because those claims could have been raised on direct appeal. Rather he is limited to raising 
ineffective assistance claims against the attorney who represented him on direct appeal. 
Cramer v. State, 2006 UT App. 492, Tf 9,153 P.3d 782; see also Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 
96, \ 14,44 P.3d 626 ("[I]ssues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, but 
were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding, absent unusual 
circumstances." ) (quoting Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994)). 
1 S~ 
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Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fail unless he can 
"show that appellate counsel omitted a dead-bang winner." Cramer v. State, 2006 UT App 
492, \ 10, 153 P.3d 782 (citing Carter, 2001 UT 965 \ 48). "A dead-bang winner ' is an Issi le 
which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in reversal 
on appeal.'" Id. (quoting Carter, 2001 UT 96 at f 48). The trial court correctly dismissed 
petitioner's petition because he cannot demonstrate that his appellate counsel overlooked any 
"dead-bang winner." 
i H E TRIAL L U I K 1 " L U R R L L T L Y L P K A T S I L D S lMlViARV 
JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS ARREST 
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE DETECTIVE REAVES DID NOT 
GIVE HIM A MIRANDA WARNING AND THAT THE DETECTIVE 
COMMITTED PERJURY BY TESTIFYING THAT HE DID. 
Petitioner argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting a claim that his trial 
counsel should have argued that Detective Reaves committed perjury when he testified that he 
gave petitioner a Miranda warning following his arrest on June 5,2003. Pet. Br. at 17-18,20-
24. Petitioner also claims that appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to assert that the lack of a Miranda warning invalidated petitioner's 
arrest and that the perjured testimony invalidated his conviction. Id. at 23-25. 
The trial court correctly rejected those claims because defendant failed to make the 
requisite showing that appellate counsel omitted a "dead-bang winner. "The lack of a 
Miranda warning has no effect on the legality of an arrest." Findings at 19, R. 381; see also 
State v. Frady, 757 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ohio App. 2001) ("before [defendant's] arrest, [the 
Officer] was under no obligation to administer warnings pursuant to Miranda). An arrest is 
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proper when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime. See 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979) ("[T]he [United States] Constitution permits 
an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the 
suspect has committed or is committing an offense"). Even assuming that Detective Reaves 
did not give a Miranda warning when he arrested petitioner, that fact would not invalidate 
petitioner's arrest. Consequently, appellate counsel overlooked no dead-bang winner with 
respect to this claim. 
Additionally, there is no credible evidence that Detective Reaves committed perjury. 
Petitioner claimed at trial, R. 391:250, and in his post-conviction petition, at 2-3, that 
Detective Reaves took him into custody and did not provide a Miranda warning. Reaves, 
however, testified that he gave petitioner a Miranda warning and that petitioner waived his 
rights and agreed to be interviewed. R. 58-59. Now, on post-conviction, Petitioner offers 
what he claims are two pages from Reaves' police report, which, according to petitioner, 
demonstrate he was not Mirandized. R. 92-93. Petitioner apparently relies on a section of 
one document, R. 93, which, under the heading "Arrestee Information," states: "Rights given 
: NO." Id. (emphasis in original). However, there is nothing on the face of the documents to 
indicate they are part of Detective Reaves' report. The pages appear to concern the burglary 
at the laundromat, but the source or authors are not identified. They could be pages of reports 
from any number of other officers who were involved at various stages of the investigation. 
These officers may have had no reason to provide a Miranda warning to the "arrestee" either 
because they did not question him or because they knew the warning had already been 
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given. Finally, it is not clear whether the "Arrestee Information" section, R. 93, even refers 
to petitioner. Petitioner's name is mentioned on that page, but under the heading "Related 
People," which suggests that the "arrestee" is someone else, perhaps Rushing. Id. 
More fundamentally, the question of whether Detective Reaves committed perjury did 
not concern the post-conviction court because it created no question of law or fact that would 
support a winning claim on appeal. See section III, below. To establish ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel, petitioner must demonstrate that there was no strategic justification for 
trial counsel not to challenge Reaves' testimony and that appellate counsel's failure to raise 
that issue on appeal was an omission of a "dead-bang winner." See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 
1232,1241 (Utah App. 1995) ("An ineffectiveness claim 'succeeds oni\ •< •• . -nceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions'") (quoting State v. 
Tennyson,'850P.2d 461,468 (UtahApp. 1993)); Cramer,2006UTApp492,H 10(tosucceed 
on post-conviction, petitioner must "show that appellate counsel omitted : u ng 
winner"). 
The post-conviction court found, and the record demonstrates, that trial counsel's 
obvious strategy was to attempt to show that petitioner's trial testimony was believable, in 
part because it was consistent with his statement to Detective Reaves. R. 381; 389:26-33; R. 
392:34-47. Petitioner's theory at trial—as reflected in his counsel's opening statement and 
One of the documents petitioner offers explicitly refers to another officers' report. 
See, e.g,. R. 92 (reference to "Report Number: 16803," submitted on June 3,2003, by Officer 
Kenneth Hammond). 
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closing argument—was that the victim, Scott Devoe, had fabricated his story regarding an 
assault and robbery because he was upset with petitioner for refusing his sexual advances and 
also for selling him counterfeit methamphetamine. See R. 389:26-33; 392:34-47. Petitioner 
told a similar story to Detective Reaves when he was arrested on June 5,2003. R. 291:58-67. 
In closing argument, trial counsel argued that petitioner was truthful when he told Detective 
Reaves that he and the victim had had a homosexual encounter. R. 392:46-47. Trial counsel 
also argued that the jury should believe petitioner's testimony because it was consistent with 
his statement to Detective Reaves. R. 392:34-47. 
Thus, the admission of petitioner's statement to Detective Reaves was crucial to this 
strategy. Any attempt to suppress the statement, or undermine the detective's credibility in 
recounting the statement by arguing that the he had perjured himself, would have been 
antithetical to counsel's strategy. Because trial counsel pursued a reasonable trial strategy in 
dealing with petitioner's statement to Detective Reaves, the trial court correctly ruled that 
appellate counsel overlooked no dead-bang winning ineffective assistance claim with respect 
to that issue. 
II. APPELLATE COUNSEL OVERLOOKED NO DEAD-BANG 
WINNING CLAIM OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, 
PERJURY OR TRIAL COURT ERROR REGARDING THE 
PROSECUTOR'S QUESTIONING OF DETECTIVE REAVES 
ABOUT A CODEFENDANT'S STATEMENT. 
Petitioner's claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning Detective 
Reaves about codefendant Rushing's statement implicating petitioner in the robbery. See, 
e.g., Pet. Br. 29,30. Petitioner also alleges that the Rushing statement did not exist and that it 
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was manufactured by Detective Reaves, who then committed perjury by testifying about its 
contents during trial. Id. at 25, 27, 29, 34. These claims have no merit whatsoever. 
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Reaves whether he had 
taken a statement from the codefendant, Rushing, while Rushing was incarcerated in the Salt 
Lake County Jail. R. 391:95-96. Rushing's counsel objected and a bench conference was 
held. R. 391:96. During the bench conference, the prosecutor understood Rushing's counsel 
to concede that the prosecutor could ask Detective Reaves about Rushing's statement. R. 
391:104. 
After the bench conference, the following exchange occurred: 
Q [Prosecutor]: What did [Rushing] say regarding this case? 
A [Detective Reaves]: He told me that he wasn't there, he had no 
knowledge of it, that he was at home asleep. 
Q: At home asleep? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: Did you talk to him about the day that this incident happened? 
A: I did. 
Q: And did you talk to him about how it started at the laundry mat? 
A: I gave him a very brief synopsis of the crime and said, tell me what 
happened. 
Q: Okay. What was the brief synopsis that you gave him? 
A: About going to the laundry mat with two other folks. I — I, obviously, 
did not give him the names. Where they got a white guy out of there, took 
him for a drive, and then robbed him. 
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Q: Okay. 
A: I wanted to know what happened. 
Q: Okay. Did the Defendant Mr. Rushing ever admit to knowing any of the 
people involved in this case? 
A: He did. Told me that at the house that night was a guy named Chicago. 
R. 391:96-97. 
At that point, petitioner's counsel objected and argued that Rushing's statement was 
inadmissible because it was hearsay, and also because he had not been given notice of the 
statement in pre-trial discovery. 391:97. The jury was excused and counsel argued the issue. 
R. 391:98-116. Both defense counsel objected to admission of Rushing's statement and 
asserted that they had not received prior notice of the statement. R. 391:99,103. Petitioner's 
counsel, Mr. Sharp, also requested that the Court instruct the jury not to consider Detective 
Reaves's testimony that Rushing had said he knew a person who went by the name of 
"Chicago," petitioner's nickname. R. 391:102. 
The Court affirmed defense counsel's objection and ruled that Rushing's statement 
was inadmissible. R. 391:112-13. The Court also ruled that it would give Mr. Sharp's 
requested cautionary instruction. R. 391:114. When the jury returned, the Court stated: 
Before we continue, I just have one instruction to give you, the jurors, that 
any reference made by Detective Reaves to Chicago or Harrison will be 
entirely disregarded by you. It is not admissible evidence and it should not 
be considered by you in the case. 
R. 391:116. 
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Petitioner raises a variety of claims based on this exchange, none successful. First, he 
attempts to raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim, which he believes would have been a 
dead-bang winner on appeal. See, e.g., Pet. Br. at 26, 30. "Prosecutorial misconduct occurs 
when the prosecutor's comments call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their 
consideration and when the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by 
significantly influencing its verdict." State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, % 18, 8 t\Jd 1025 
(quotations and citation omitted). An appellate court will reverse on a prosecutorial 
misconduct claim only "[i]f the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury 
would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). "When a court sustains an objection and gives a curative instruction, a 
defendant must show that 'the [prosecutor's] comment was so prejudicial as to defeat the 
mitigating effect of the court's . . . curative instructions.'" Taylor v. State, 2007 Utah 12, f^ 
115, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (quoting State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, \ 24, 999 P 2cI 7). 
Petitioner cannot meet this burden. The portion of the Rushing statement admitted at 
trial was due to a misunderstanding between the prosecutor and defense attorneys. Moreover, 
the testimony was almost completely innocuous. The single reference to Rushing stating that 
he knew "Chicago," i.e., petitioner, was harmless because petitioner testified that he knew 
Rushing and that they were both at the laundromat on the night of the robbery. R. 391:215, 
234. Thus, the record demonstrates that Reaves' testimony concerning the Rushing statement 
did not "call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration" and created no 
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prejudice at all, let alone prejudice creating "a reasonable likelihood the jury would have 
reached a more favorable result absent the comments." Reed, 2000 UT 68, f^ 18. 
Nor did appellate counsel overlook a dead-bang winning claim regarding the Court's 
curative instruction. Petitioner argued in the post-conviction court that the curative 
instruction was insufficient because Detective Reaves's testimony regarding Rushing's 
statement "prejudiced petitioner to a degree that a curative instruction by the court could not 
remove[] the taint from the jury." Petition at 17. He also claimed that although "the court 
ruled that the entire Bulice Rushing statement was inadmissible, [the court] failed to instruct 
the jury to disregard the entire statement." Petition at 18; see also Pet. Br. at 26. On appeal, 
petitioner avers that "[a]ppellate counsel refused to include in the direct appeal, that the 
Bulice Rushing statement was false and manufactured and therefore prosecutorial misconduct 
in denying appellant's right to fair trial and due process of law." Pet. Br. at 16. 
The Court's curative instruction covered the entire portion of Rushing's statement 
implicating petitioner. As explained above, the only evidence of Rushing's statement that the 
jury heard was that Rushing claimed that he was home asleep on the night of the robbery, and 
that he knew an individual named Chicago. R. 391:96-97. The Court instructed the jury to 
disregard "any reference made by Detective Reaves to Chicago or Harrison." R. 391:116. 
The instruction was more than adequate to remove any taint from the use of the Rushing 
statement. 
Petitioner also revisits his perjury theme, this time claiming "the Bulice Rushing 
statement never existed, and was false and manufactured evidence." Pet. Br. at 27. In support 
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of this claim, petitioner cites to a portion of a letter from the Weber County Attorney's Office, 
which responds to petitioner's GRAMA request for a "copy of the statement given to 
Detective Steve Reeves of the Ogden City Police Department by Bulice Rushing dated June 
17, 2003 at the Salt Lake County Jail." See R. 348. The Weber County Attorneys Office's 
response states: "We do not have a copy of any such statement in either file [Harrison's or 
Rushing's]. You may want to direct your GRAMA request to the Ogden City Police 
Department and see if they have the requested documents." Id. This response provides no 
support for petitioner's claim that the Rushing statement does not exist; rather, it merely 
directs petitioner to the most likely repository for the statement—the Ogden Police 
Department. 
Even assuming arguendo that the introduction of a portion of the Rushing statement 
involved some kind of error—either by the trial court, the prosecutor or petitioner's trial 
counsel—petitioner was not prejudiced. The jury heard only that Rushing told Detective 
Reaves that he was home asleep during the robbery and that an individual named Chicago 
was at the house with Rushing on the night of the robbery. R. 391:96-97. This evidence was 
not prejudicial because petitioner testified that he knew Rushing and that they were both at 
the laundromat on the night of the robbery. R. 391:215, 234. Moreover, the Court gave a 
curative instruction that the jury was not to consider Rushing's statement that he knew 
petitioner. R. 391:116. Therefore, appellate counsel would not have likely prevailed mi ,i 
challenge to the introduction of a portion of the Rushing statement or the trial court's curative 
instruction. 
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III. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
THAT THERE WERE FACT ISSUES PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE NOT PRESERVED AND ARE 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
For the first time on appeal, petitioner attempts to argue that there were material 
factual disputes that should have precluded summary judgment. Pet. Br. at 15-19. He 
appears to claim that there is a fact issue about whether appellate counsel omitted a winning 
argument when he did not claim that Detective Reaves "manufactured and falsified evidence 
and then committing [sic] perjury at jury trial by using false/manufactured statements against" 
the petitioner. Id. at 16. Petitioner concludes that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
not claiming trial counsel was ineffective for "not fully reading the Ogden Police report" 
because the report somehow would have demonstrated Detective Reaves manufactured the 
statements, which should have been suppressed. Id. at 18. 
Petitioner fares no better with his revised claims because, even if they had been 
properly presented to the post-conviction court, they would not have created a genuine issue 
of material fact. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
"2 
Petitioner did not argue to the post-conviction court that Detective Reaves statements 
should have been suppressed. Rather, he simply claimed generally that Reaves committed 
perjury and that this somehow entitled petitioner to relief. See Petition. In any event, even if 
petitioner had argued that the statements he and Rushing made to Reaves should have been 
suppressed, he would not have succeeded, mainly because there was no credible evidence that 
the statements were fabricated, but also because the statements were either innocuous or 
consistent with defendant's trial testimony and therefore harmless. 
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). "The 
existence of a dispute concerning even very significant facts does not preclude summary 
judgment where, for example, no matter which way the facts are resolved, the plaintiff could 
not" succeed. Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 559, n.7 (Utah 1994). Within the post-
conviction context, petitioner must demonstrate an issue of material fact as to whether 
petitioner's appellate counsel overlooked a dead-bang winning argument on appeal. See, e.g., 
Cramer, 2006 UT App 492, ^ 10 (to succeed on post-conviction, petitioner must "show that 
appellate counsel omitted a dead-bang winner"). 
Questions concerning statements made to Reaves by petitioner and by co-defendant 
Rushing would not create material factual disputes precluding summary judgment because, 
even assuming that Detective Reaves did manufacture evidence—an assumption in no way 
warranted by the evidence—there is no likelihood that such claims would have succeeded on 
appeal. This is because the statements attributed to the defendants by Detective Reaves were 
either innocuous or consistent with defense strategy that the victim, Scott Devoe, had 
fabricated his story regarding the assault and robbery because he was upset with petitioner for 
refusing his sexual advances and also for selling him counterfeit methamphetamine. See R. 
389:26-33; 392:34-47. The post-conviction court found, and the record demonstrates, that 
trial counsel's obvious strategy was to attempt to show that petitioner's trial testimony was 
believable, in part because it was consistent with his statement to Detective Reaves. R. 3 81; 
389:26-33; R. 392:34-47. Thus, even if petitioner had specifically and properly challenged 
the veracity of Detective Reaves testimony before the post-conviction court, there would still 
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be no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of the 
petition. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the post-conviction court's decision 
granting the State's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the petition for post-
conviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part VII. Judgment 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim 
or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable 
expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.] 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
MCHUGH, J. 
*1 Markell Jesse Harrison appeals his enhanced 
conviction for robbery, see Utah Code Ann. § § 76-
3-203.1, -6-301 (2003), and his conviction for 
attempted burglary, see id. § § 76-4-101, -6-202 
(2003). We affirm. 
Harrison argues that he received ineffective 
assistance when his trial counsel failed to make any 
pretrial motions or objections during trial to prevent 
the introduction of evidence of Harrison's prior drug 
use and to object to the introduction of evidence of 
his codefendant's alleged drug sales. "An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on 
appeal presents a question of law" that we review for 
correctness. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 
162. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Harrison "must meet the heavy burden of 
showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient 
performance which fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
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To satisfy the first prong of this test, Harrison "must 
rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Carter v. Galetka, 
2001 UT 96,1f 40> 4 4 P-3d 626 (quotations and 
citation omitted); see also State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 
1232, 1241 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ("An ineffectiveness 
claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate 
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's 
actions." (quotations and citation omitted)). 
"Moreover, this court will not second-guess trial 
counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however 
flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." 
Perry, 899 P.2d at 1241 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Our review of the record reveals that trial counsel's 
alleged failures were, in fact, tactical choices he made 
that comported with his strategy for defending 
Harrison-namely, that although Harrison may have 
been involved with and used drugs, that did not make 
Harrison guilty of the charged crimes. Indeed, 
Harrison's trial counsel referenced Harrison's 
involvement with drugs and prior drug use in both his 
opening and closing statements. In addition, defense 
counsel also elicited testimony from Harrison 
concerning his involvement with drugs and prior drug 
use. Because we have determined that the alleged 
failures of Harrison's trial counsel were the product 
of trial strategy, we conclude that Harrison has failed 
to satisfy the first prong of the test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Therefore, his claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See State v. 
Wright, 2004 UT App 102,1 9, 90 P.3d 644 
("[B]ecause a defendant has the burden of meeting 
both parts of [this] test, it is unnecessary for this court 
to apply both parts where our inquiry reveals that one 
of its parts is not satisfied." (first alteration in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Harrison also argues that the trial court committed 
plain error by failing to exclude evidence of his prior 
drug use and his codefendant's alleged drug sales. 
"However, we do not appraise all rulings objected to 
for the first time on appeal under the plain error 
doctrine. For example, if trial counsel's actions 
amounted to an active, as opposed to a passive, 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
waiver of an objection, we may decline to consider 
the claim of plain error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d END OF DOCUMENT 
155, 158 (Utah 1989). 
*2 In the context of this case, before addressing 
[Harrison]'s claim of plain error, it is necessary to 
address the threshold issues: Was the failure to raise 
the objections before the trial court the result of a 
consciously chosen strategy of trial counsel rather 
than an oversight, and if it was a strategic decision, 
did the making of that choice constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel? If the decision was conscious 
and did not amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, [we] should refuse to consider the merits of 
the trial court's ruling.... 
The necessity for an appellate court's following such 
an approach is obvious when the consequences of the 
alternative are considered. If trial counsel were 
permitted to forego objecting to evidence as part of a 
trial strategy that counsel thinks will enhance the 
defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that 
strategy fails, were permitted to claim on appeal that 
[we] should reverse because it was plain error for the 
court to admit the evidence, we would be sanctioning 
a procedure that fosters invited error. Defendants are 
thus not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at 
trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal. 
Id. at 158-59 (footnote omitted); see also State v. 
Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). We have already concluded that the 
alleged failures of Harrison's trial counsel were part 
of a conscious and sound trial strategy that did not 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Therefore, we "decline to consider the claim of plain 
error." Bullock, 791 P .2d at 158. 
Finally, Harrison asserts that he was denied his right 
to confrontation when the trial court allowed a 
witness to testify about certain statements that 
Harrison's codefendant made concerning the 
commission of the charged crimes. Because Harrison 
has not demonstrated that this issue was preserved at 
trial and does not argue plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal, we do not address its 
merits. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 
1996). 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate 
Presiding Judge, WILLIAM A. THORNE Jr., Judge. 
Utah App.,2005. 
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